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Abstract
This paper compares the effects of unitary and ad valorem taxes in a homogeneous
good market where two technologies are freely available. We find that, both in
monopolies and Cournot oligopolies, unit taxes may be welfare superior to ad
valorem taxes.
1 Introduction
The comparison between ad valorem and unit taxes has long been of wide interest in
the study of public economics, both for theoretical and policy reasons. In competitive
markets, each ad valorem and unit taxes yield equal results. In monopolies, Suits and
Musgrave (1953) proved the superiority of ad valorem taxation. Delipalla and Keen
(1992) examined different models of symmetric oligopoly with and without free entry to
compare the two types of tax regimes and find that ad valorem taxation often provides
a better result. Skeath and Trandel (1994) raised this superiority, nowadays widely
accepted in the literature, to a higher level by showing that in a monopoly ad valorem
taxation Pareto-dominates unit taxes, producing larger profits, tax revenues and consumer
surplus, and extending this result to symmetric Cournot oligopolies with linear demand,
when government’s revenue is sufficiently large. Denicolo and Matteuzzi (2000) and later
Anderson et al. (2001) found that ad valorem taxes are always better than unitary ones in
asymmetric Cournot oligopolies with homogeneous goods.
However, this matter may not be fully closed. Anderson et al. (2001) proved that,
under Bertrand competition with product differentiation, the superiority of ad valorem
taxes can be reversed. Blackorby and Murty (2007) considered a special case, in which the
government taxes away a monopoly’s whole profit in a general equilibrium, to show that
ad valorem and unitary taxation are equivalent. Lockwood (2004), in a standard model of
tax competition, showed that residents in all countries are worse off when competition is
in ad valorem taxes. Dröge and Schröder (2009) concluded that, where the main objective
of the tax is to reduce a negative externality, unit taxes may be superior in terms of
welfare effects. Wang and Zhao (2009) showed that with sufficiently differentiated goods
and a high enough cost variance and taxes, unit taxes can be superior to ad valorem taxes
if asymmetric (Cournot or Bertrand) oligopolies are considered.
Most of these examples rely on significant changes to the basic model to achieve
reversal of the classical superiority of ad valorem taxes. This paper implements a small
∗Department of Economics, Universidad de Navarra, Campus Universitario, 31080, Pamplona, Spain.
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variation to the classical model: the availability of two technologies. With this additional
hypothesis, we find that the superiority of ad valorem taxes can be reversed in non trivial
examples. Even in monopoly settings, where traditional theory indicates that ad valorem
taxes are a much better choice, it is possible to find cases (although unlikely) where the
corresponding unit taxes would be preferable. tax could be a better option for society.
We investigate the welfare superiority of ad valorem taxation in monopoly and oligopoly
settings where two technologies are available to firms. One can easily think of situations
where technology choice is possible, for example in sectors with strong R&D components,
transition periods between labor and capital intensive technologies, etc. Technology
changes can be understood also as firms investing to improve the efficiency of their
productive processes. These investments can take many forms. Some imply minor
modifications (such as big or small repairs in machinery, task reorganizations or in-the-job
training) while others result in significant changes and costs (for example purchases of
new machinery, the building of a new plant, cost reduction task forces, etc). For the sake
of this paper, technology choice means a reduction in variable costs at the expense of
some fixed costs, or vice versa. We believe our results to be of particular importance for
oligopolies although, for completeness, we also study the monopoly case.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section two will discuss unit and ad valorem taxes in a
monopoly. We will show that in the presence of a technological change that causes an
increase in prices, ad valorem taxes could do worse than the equivalent unit taxes, while
in general ad valorem taxes are the better alternative if the new technology decreases
marginal costs. To conclude this section we will show that, even with a technology that
cuts marginal costs, examples can be provided where unit taxes could be superior to ad
valorem taxes if conditional taxation is possible. Section three contains some examples
that seem to be in contradiction with the results of Denicolo and Matteuzzi (2000) and
Anderson et al. (2001), by allowing firms to choose among different technologies. Under
these circumstances, we show that unit taxes can be welfare superior to ad valorem taxes
in asymmetric Cournot oligopolies. Section four concludes.
2 Monopoly
The usual knowledge on taxes has it that for any unit tax t, there is always a Pareto
superior ad valorem tax. In this section, we will consider the welfare effects of ad valorem
and unit taxes in the presence of different technological changes and see how the generally
accepted result can be reversed. We shall provide three main results:
(a) In proposition 1, we will see how unit taxes may perform better than ad valorem taxes
if the new technology causes an increase in prices. (b) Propositions 2 and 3 will prove
that, under certain conditions, if marginal costs decrease with the new technology, ad
valorem taxes are always the better alternative. (c) Proposition 4 illustrates a result that
is more of a curiosity: even if the new technology decreases marginal costs, unit taxes
may be better if the government imposes conditional taxes that change according to the
technology implemented.
Proposition 1. Consider a profit maximizing monopoly. When a technological change
causes an increase in prices, it is possible that a Pareto inferior unit tax provides a higher
level of welfare than the ad valorem tax.
Proof. Suppose a linear demand1 P = a−Q, a technology with fixed costs F and no
1Throughout the paper we use the capital P for the price that consumers pay, and the lower-case p
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variable costs, with two possible tax regimes: unit tax, t; and ad valorem tax, τ . The
basic equilibrium variables (quantity, government income and profit) in both tax regimes
are:
Unit tax: Qt =
a− t
2 ; Gt =
t(a− t)
2 ; Πt =
(a− t)2
4 − F. (1)
Ad valorem: Qτ =
a
2; Gτ = τ
a2
4 ; Πτ = (1− τ)
a2
4 − F. (2)
In order to find an ad valorem tax, τ , that is Pareto superior to the unit tax, t, (i)
prices must be lower, so that consumers are better off, which is always the case for t > 0;
(ii) government revenue must be higher; i.e. τ ≥ 2t(a − t)/a2; and (iii) the firm must
receive higher profits; i.e. τ ≤ t(2a− t)/a2. In sum, the ad valorem tax, τ , will be Pareto
superior to the unit tax, t, if τ ∈ [2t(a−t)
a2 ,
t(2a−t)
a2 ] for the existing technology.
Let’s consider now that a new technology with constant marginal cost c and no fixed
costs becomes available. The quantity and profit in both tax regimes are:
Unit tax: Qt =
a− t− c
2 ; Πt =
(a− t− c)2
4 . (3)
Ad valorem: Qτ =
a
2 −
c
2(1− τ) ; Πτ = (1− τ)
(
a
2 −
c
2(1− τ)
)2
. (4)
Let us call Ft = c(2a−2t−c4 ), Fτ = c(
a
2 − c4(1−τ)), and F0 = (a−t)
2
4 . Then the following
statements follow:
(a) Whenever F > Ft, the firm with a unit tax regime prefers the technology with
c > 0; this can be seen by comparing the profits from equations 1 and 3.
(b) Whenever F > Fτ , the firm with the ad valorem regime prefers the technology
with c > 0; this can be seen by comparing the profits from equations 2 and 4.
(c) When F ≤ F0, the firm has no negative profits with the zero marginal cost regime.
This follows from equation 1.
Comparing equations 3 and 4 enables us to conclude that if c > t(1 − τ)/τ , then
Qct > Q
c
τ . And comparing Ft and Fτ yields that whenever c < 2t(1− τ)/τ , then Ft < Fτ .
Then, suppose that in an industry with demand P = a−Q there is a monopoly with
zero marginal costs and a fixed cost F . The government considers a unit tax t, but prefers
a Pareto superior ad valorem tax τ . A new technology with constant marginal costs, c
appears, such that t(1− τ)/τ < c < 2t(1− τ)/τ . Besides, Fτ < F ≤ F0. Then, since the
firm will definitely switch to the technology with the higher marginal cost in both tax
regimes, and will produce more with the unit regime, then welfare will be higher with the
unit tax2.
To illustrate the results of proposition 1, we provide a numerical example below.
Numerical example
Let the demand function be P = 100−Q and the unit tax t = 10. Then, the set of
ad valorem tax Pareto superior to t = 10, for a zero marginal cost, is τ ∈ [0.18, 0.19].
Suppose that c = 46, then c > t(1− τ)/τ for any τ ∈ [0.18, 0.19]. Then, it follows that:
Ft = 391, Fτ ∈ (1646.91, 1654.88), and F0 = 2025.
for the price that the producers get. In the absence of taxes, we will use either of them.
2It may be worth noting that society would prefer that the firm remained with the old technology.
However, the monopoly will decide to switch.
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When the fixed cost, F , of the old technology is between 1655 and 2025, and a new
technology with zero fixed costs, and constant marginal costs c = 46, appears, then welfare
will be higher with the unit tax t = 10 than with any Pareto superior tax τ ∈ [0.18, 0.19].
It may be argued that the government could define a new ad valorem tax for the new
technology that is Pareto superior to the unit tax. This is true, but in Proposition 4 we
show that such a contingent tax can be favorable to the unit tax. 
The next two propositions will consider what happens if the new technology decreases
prices.
Proposition 2. For both unit and ad valorem taxes, if a profit maximizing monopoly
prefers a technology that increases its production level (Qn ≥ Q), so will society.
Proof. Let us first consider the case where Qn = Q. If the monopoly prefers the
new technology, so will society, since profits increase and both consumer surplus and
government revenue remain the same, independently of the tax scheme.
When Qn > Q, consumers are better off because prices are lower. Government revenue
will increase under unit taxes (because the quantity sold is increased) and under ad
valorem taxes (as long as the marginal cost and marginal revenue are positive so that
revenues are increasing with quantity). Again, if the monopoly prefers the new technology,
so will society since consumers and government are also better off. 
Note that the reverse is not true. That is, it is possible for society to prefer a price-
lowering technology that firms do not want to adopt. One such example can be found
for a monopoly with constant marginal costs of 2, facing a demand given by P = 6−Q.
Under these conditions, profits are equal to 4, while society’s welfare (consumer surplus
plus profits) is 6. If a new technology becomes available with zero marginal costs and
a fixed cost of 6, the profits of the monopoly would be lower (3), but welfare would be
higher (7.5).
Proposition 3. Let’s consider an ad valorem tax, τ , which is Pareto superior to the unit
tax, t, in a market where a profit maximizing monopoly sells its product. The market
shows decreasing marginal income and non-decreasing marginal costs. When a technology
change decreases marginal costs by introducing a fixed cost F , the ad valorem tax, τ , will
be superior to the unit tax, t, for consumers, the firm and welfare, though it may not be
so for the government.
Proof. In order to prove the proposition we will consider the following four possibilities:
(a) The firm does not adopt the technology change under either tax scheme. Then, τ
is Pareto superior to t, according to the initial hypothesis.
(b) The firm adopts the technology change in the presence of the unit tax, but not
under the ad valorem tax. We will see this is an impossible situation.
(c) The firm adopts the technology change in the presence of the ad valorem tax, but
not under the unit tax. In this case, we will show that τ is still Pareto superior to t.
(d) The firm adopts the technology change under either tax scheme. We will show
that production will be larger under ad valorem taxes than under unit taxes, meaning
profits for the firm would be higher and prices paid by consumers lower, but government
revenue may not increase.
Figure 1 contains the gist of the proof. We will prove that area A+B (the increment
in profit for the ad valorem tax) is higher than area A (the increment in profit for the
unitary tax).
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Now we consider each case in turn. (a) It needs no proof. (b) Let I ′ be the marginal
revenue associated to the demand. Solving (1 − τ)I ′ = I ′ − t, we get I ′ = t/τ . As I ′
is decreasing, there is only one point, xˆ, such that I ′(xˆ) = t/τ . For simplicity’s sake,
we impose that the marginal cost of the “old” technology (c′) be non-decreasing, so it
necessarily intersects the marginal revenues at a point such that xˆ < Qt < Qτ , where Qt is
the production t and Qτ with tax τ . Let n′ be the marginal cost of the “new” technology.
Qnt Q
n
τxˆ
Q
p
I ′ − t
(1− τ)I ′
c′
n′
QτQt
A
B
Figure 1: Two different marginal cost curves (n′ < c′) in two tax regimes (t and τ).
Note that Qnt can be greater or lower than Qτ .
The monopolist will adopt the new technology with the unit tax, t, if∫ Qt
0
(I ′ − t− n′)dx+
∫ Qnt
Qt
(I ′ − t− n′)dx− F >
∫ Qt
0
(I ′ − t− c′)dx,
or ∫ Qt
0
(c′ − n′)dx+
∫ Qnt
Qt
(I ′ − t− n′)dx > F. (5)
Similarly, with the ad valorem tax, the firm would adopt the new technology when∫ Qt
0
(c′ − n′)dx+
∫ Qτ
Qt
(c′ − n′)dx+
∫ Qnτ
Qτ
((1− τ)I ′ − n′)dx > F. (6)
Remember that Qt < Qτ and (1− τ)I ′ > I ′− t for any x > Qt; consequently, Qnt < Qnτ .
Also, the monopoly maximizes its profit, c′ is non-decreasing and I ′ is decreasing, which
implies that c′ ≥ I ′− t for x ≥ Qt and (1− τ)I ′ ≥ n′ for x ≤ Qnτ . Therefore, the left hand
side in 6 is greater than the left hand side in 5, and that means that if the left hand side
in 5 is higher than F , then the left hand side in 6 will also be greater than F . Hence, it is
impossible that the firm adopts the new technology in the presence of the unit tax, but
not under the ad valorem tax.
(c) Let’s assume the firm adopts the new technology if taxes are ad valorem, but not
unitary. We know that (i) Qτ > Qt and Qnτ > Qτ , so that prices are lower and consumers
are better off with ad valorem taxes. (ii) If the firm switches to the new technology under
ad valorem taxation it must be that Πnτ > Πτ and, by hypothesis Πτ > Πt, so the firm is
better off since it has higher profits. (iii) By hypothesis, Gτ > Gt. Since the marginal cost
cannot be negative, the marginal revenue (which is decreasing) will be positive. Hence,
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revenue, pQ, increases and so does government collection. Also, the fixed cost taken on
by the firm does not diminish welfare, as we saw in proposition 2. In sum the ad valorem
tax is Pareto superior to the unit tax since consumers, the firm, and the government are
all better off.
(d) The firm adopts the new technology under both tax schemes. We can see that
(i) consumers are better off, since c′ > n′ and (1− τ)I ′ > I ′ − t imply Qnτ > Qnt , so that
prices are lower with ad valorem taxes. (ii) The firm is better off because in (b) we proved
that the increment in profits will be larger with ad valorem taxes than with unit taxes.
But (iii) it is easy to find examples where government revenue decreases with ad valorem
taxes. For instance, consider a case where P = 10 − Q, c = 2 with an ad valorem tax
τ = 0.2 that is is Pareto superior to t = 1.4. If the marginal cost decreases to c = 0,
government revenue will be higher with t than with τ .
This concludes the proof. 
As we saw in proposition 3, when a cost-reducing technology is adopted, government
revenue may increase more under unitary than ad valorem taxes. If taxes were to be
designed so that government revenue was to remain constant under both technologies,
would the ad valorem tax be socially preferable? The answer is not clear, as we will see
in proposition 4. That is, unit taxes may be better under some circumstances. To keep
government revenue constant, we must consider a conditional tax that changes according
to the technology implemented, which to our knowledge is not used in real life. Yet, it
provides an interesting theoretical result.
Proposition 4. Let’s consider a monopoly with a linear demand. The monopoly can
choose between two alternative technologies, both with constant marginal costs. A condi-
tional tax that depends on the technology implemented by the firm is enacted so that the
government revenue is the same independently of the tax scheme. Under these conditions
welfare will be higher under unit taxes for some values of the fixed cost, F .
Proof. Suppose a linear demand P = a − Q and a monopolist with two available
technologies. The first has fixed cost F and no variable costs, while the second technology
has constant marginal cost c and no fixed costs. The government considers two possible
conditional tax regimes, depending on the technology: unit tax {t0, tc}, and ad valorem
tax {τ0, τc}. The government first chooses the type of tax, and then the firm chooses the
technology.
The government designs the taxes so that the revenue is the same in the four possibilities
(c and τ , 0 and τ , c and t; and c and τ). From equations 1 through 4 we get government
revenue for all four cases:
Unit tax: Gt0 =
t0(a− t0)
2 ; Gtc =
tc(a− c− tc)
2 . (7)
Ad valorem: Gτ0 = τ0
a2
4 ; Gτc =
τc
4
a2 − ( c(1− τc)
)2 . (8)
We want to find the following scenario. If the government enacts the ad valorem tax,
then the firm prefers the technology with no fixed costs because Πτc > Πτ0 . When the
government chooses the unit tax, then the firm chooses the technology with fixed costs,
because Πt0 > Πtc . Besides, in order to prove the proposition we need that welfare is
6
τc tc τ0 t0
P 280 292 230 244
Q 180 168 230 216
G 6048 6048 6048 6048
Π 28512 28224 28452 28256
W 50760 48384 60950 57632
Table 1: A conditional tax for a monopolist.
higher with the unitary tax. We provide an example below to show that this possibility is
real. And this example proves the proposition.
The demand is P = 460 − Q; c = 88. The result of this example holds for any
F ∈ (18341, 18432), but let us suppose that F = 18400. The objective of the government
is to raise G = 6048. Then, from equations 7 and 8, we get the following: τc = 0.12,
τ0 = 151213225 , tc = 36 and t0 = 28. In Table 1, we use equations 1, 2, 3 and 4 to find the
quantities, Q, and profits, Π. The prices that consumers pay, P = 460 − Q, are easily
obtained from the quantities. The values for the government, G, we already knew. Welfare
comes from W = (a− c)Q−Q2/2, or W = aQ−Q2/2− F .
It is clear from Table 1 that when the government chooses the ad valorem tax, the
firm prefers a profit 28512 to 28452. And when the government prefers the unitary tax,
the firm will choose the technology with fixed costs because it gets a profit 28256 rather
than the profit with the other technology, 28224. Taking into account the incentives for
the firm, welfare is higher with the unitary tax. Welfare would be even higher if the
government could force the adoption of the fixed cost technology, but we suppose that
the firm is the one that chooses its technology. 
3 Oligopoly
According to Denicolo and Matteuzzi (2000) and Anderson et al. (2001), ad valorem taxes
are welfare superior to unit taxes under Cournot competition in the presence of cost
asymmetries. In this section, we will provide evidence that seems to be in contradiction
with this result. The reason for this difference is that in our case firms can choose among
different technologies. We will see how, under these conditions, we may find a different
number of firms adopting the new technology depending on whether taxes are ad valorem
or unitary. Let’s start with a numerical example to illustrate this possibility and we will
formalize later.
3.1 Numerical example
In this example we show that, in an asymmetric oligopoly, a unitary tax may be welfare
superior to an ad valorem tax, if firms can choose the technology freely.
Let’s consider a demand function such that P = 70−Q in a market with three firms
that engage in Cournot competition. In this market, there is an existing technology,
with costs c(x) = 89 + 9x; and a second (new) technology becomes available; this “new”
technology has a fixed cost F = 305 and no variable costs. Let r denote the number of
firms that adopt the new technology.
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If the government imposes an ad valorem tax of 10%, the demand (as perceived by the
firms) will be p = (1− τ)(70−Q) = 63− 0.9Q. Solving Cournot3, we obtain the figures
shown in Table 2. Each column represents the Cournot solution for a given number of
adopters. For example, when r = 1, only one firm adopts the new technology. In this case,
and with τ = 10%,the price will be 22.5; total quantity, 47.5; profits for firms with the
old technology will amount to 51.6, while profits for firms with the new technology will
amount to 150.6; total welfare will be 1488.9, and government revenue will be 106.87.
r = 0 r = 1 r = 2 r = 3
P 25 22.5 20 17.5
p 22.5 20.25 18 15.75
Q 45 47.5 50 52.5
Πold 113.5 51.6 1 −38,37
Πnew − 150.6 55 −29,37
W 1465.5 1488.9 1461 1381,87
G 112.5 106.87 100 91,87
Table 2: Cournot oligopoly with demand p = 70−Q, ad valorem tax τ = 0.1, and two
cost functions c1(x) = 89 + 9x and c2(x) = 305. The parameter r indicates
the number of adopters of the new technology.
As we can see from Table 2, two firms will switch to the new technology in this example.
To see this, let’s compare the profit levels for firms with the various numbers of adopters.
If one firm was to adopt the new technology (r = 1), its profits would increase from 113.5
to 150.6. If another firm switches (r = 2), its profits would go from 51.6 to 55. If the
last firm switches (r = 3), its profits would go from 1 to negative, which is not a feasible
solution. Then, in the equilibrium (noted in bold), two out of the three firms will adopt
the new technology.
Following Denicolo and Matteuzzi (2000) and Anderson et al. (2001), this ad valorem
tax should be superior to unitary taxation in an asymmetric oligopoly. However, in the
example below we will show precisely the opposite result and see how imposing a unit tax
may actually increase welfare in this situation, rather than decrease it. The reason for
this discrepancy is that in those models firms have not the possibility of choosing among
different technologies.
Let us now assume that the government imposes a unit tax of t = 2.2, so the perceived
demand function would be p = 70 − 2.2 − Q = 67.8 − Q. To compare the possible
solutions (r = 0, r = 1, r = 2, r = 3) under the unit tax, we construct Table 3, similar
to Table 2, that we used for the case with an ad valorem tax. In Table 3 we can
see that in the optimal solution (r = 1), one firm adopts the new technology since
Πold(r = 0) = 127.09 < 155.1 = Πnew(r = 1) and Πnew(r = 2) = 63.64 < 66 = Πold(r = 1).
A comparison of Tables 2 and 3 provides several insights. First, more firms adopt the
new technology under ad valorem taxation (r = 2) than under unit taxes (r = 1). Second,
both welfare and government revenues are higher under unitary taxation (G = 101.97
and W = 1463.2) than under ad valorem taxation (G = 100 and W = 1461). Hence,
when firms are free to choose their technology, the superiority of ad valorem taxation over
unitary taxation in an asymmetric Cournot oligopoly may no longer be maintained.
3As it is well known, for a Cournot oligopoly with linear demand p = a− bQ and n firms with constant
marginal costs, ci, the price and quantities in equilibrium are p =
a+
∑
ci
1+n and qi =
p−ci
b
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r = 0 r = 1 r = 2 r = 3
P 25.9 23.65 21.4 19.15
p 23.7 21.45 19.2 16.95
Q 44.1 46.35 48.6 50.85
Πold 127.09 66 15.04 −25.8
Πnew − 155.1 63.64 −17.7
W 1450.7 1463.2 1430.22 1351.64
G 97.02 101.97 106.92 111.87
Table 3: Cournot oligopoly with demand p = 70 − Q, unitary tax t = 2.2, and two
cost functions c1(x) = 89 + 9x and c2(x) = 305. The parameter r indicates
the number of adopters of the new technology.
In the next sections, we will formalize the intuition provided in this example. First, we
will consider the case of two technologies without taxes, and then we will introduce taxes.
3.2 Two technologies without taxes
In this subsection we see that excess adoption of a lower marginal cost technology may be
pervasive in oligopolies.
Let’s consider a market with a demand function given by p = a − bQ and n firms
engaging in Cournot competition. Firms have two technologies at their disposal. The
“old” technology has a cost function such that c(x) = K + hx, while the “new” technology
has costs given by c(x) = F +K + cx, with c < h and K,F > 0. Firms will adopt the new
technology, with lower marginal costs, if it’s profitable for them. As before, r ∈ {0, . . . , n}
will denote the number of adopters. The equilibrium values are given by4:
p(r) = a+ rc+ (n− r)h1 + n ; qh(r) =
p(r)− h
b
; qc(r) =
p(r)− c
b
. (9)
From here we get
qh(r) > 0⇔ a+ rc− (r + 1)h > 0. (10)
Profits for each type of firm will be given by:
Πh(r) =
1
b
(
a− r(h− c)− h
1 + n
)2
−K = Bh(r); (11)
Πc(r) =
1
b
(
a+ (n− r)(h− c)− c
1 + n
)2
−K − F = Bc(r)− F. (12)
Let’s calculate now the threshold values for adoption of the new technology from the
firm’s point of view. Suppose there are already r − 1 adopters. An additional firm will
adopt the new technology if its profits are higher; that is, Πh(r − 1) < Πc(r). Suppose
that now there are r adopters. No firm will not adopt the new technology if its profits are
higher were it to stay with the old technology; that is, Πh(r) > Πc(r + 1).
4Where h denotes the old technology and c the new one.
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Therefore, joining these two conditions and solving for F , we will find the equilibrium
number of adopters (r) when F is such that:
Bc(r + 1)−Bh(r) < F < Bc(r)−Bh(r − 1).
Let f(r) = Bc(r)−Bh(r − 1), so that the expression above becomes
f(r + 1) < F < f(r), (13)
where
f(r) = (h− c) [2n(a− c) + (h− c)n(n− 2r)]
b(n+ 1)2 . (14)
Let’s calculate now the threshold values for adoption of the new technology from
society’s point of view. Let W (r) be total welfare when there are r adopters. Then,
W (r) = 12b
(
a2 − p(r)2
)
− rcqc(r)− (n− r)hqh(r)− nK − rF.
Society would prefer an additional firm to adopt the new technology if the social welfare
associated with r adopters is higher than the social welfare of having r − 1 adopters.
That is, society would prefer r adopters to r − 1 if W (r) > W (r − 1); and would prefer r
adopters to r + 1 if W (r) > W (r + 1). Let us call V (r) = W (r) + rF .
Therefore, joining these two conditions and solving for F , we will find the equilibrium
number of adopters (r) when F is such that:
V (r + 1)− V (r) < F < V (r)− V (r − 1)
Let s(r) = V (r) − V (r − 1) = W (r) −W (r − 1) − F . Then, the optimal number of
adopters from society’s point of view is r whenever
s(r + 1) < F < s(r). (15)
In order to find an explicit expression for s(r), notice, from equation 9, that p(r) −
p(r − 1) = h−c1+n and qc(r) − qc(r − 1) = qh(r) − qh(r − 1) = h−cb(1+n) . Then rearranging
W (r)−W (r − 1)− F = s(r), yields:
s(r) =
(h− c)
[
(n+ 2)(a− c) + (h− c)
(
(n+ 1)2 − r(2n+ 3)− 12
)]
b(n+ 1)2 (16)
Comparing the threshold values for society and firms we can conclude that when
F ∈ [s(r), f(r)], there are too many adopters from society’s point of view, and when
F ∈ [f(r), s(r)], there are too few adopters from society’s point of view.
We can calculate
f(r)− s(r) = (h− c)
[
(a− c)(n− 2) + (h− c)
(
3r − 2n− 12
)]
b(n+ 1)2 . (17)
and enunciate the following proposition
Proposition 5. We consider a Cournot market with linear demand, p = a − Q, and
n ≥ 1 firms that may choose between these two cost functions: c1(q) = K + hq and
c2(q) = F + K + cq, with 0 ≤ c < h and K, F > 0. When n = 1, there is insufficient
adoption of the low-cost technology for some values of F , but never excess adoption. If
n = 2, there is both insufficient and excess adoption. When n ≥ 4a+c−5h2a+2c−4h there is only
excess adoption.
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Proof. Remember that there is excess adoption when F ∈ [s(r), f(r)], and insufficient
adoption when F ∈ [f(r), s(r)]. From equation 17, we can see first that for n = 1,
f(1)− s(1) < 0. For n = 2, f(1)− s(1) < 0, but f(2)− s(2) > 0; so that if only one firm
adopts the low cost technology, there can be insufficient adoption, but if the two firms
adopt the new technology, there may be excess adoption. Let us consider n > 2. It is
clear that f(r)− s(r) is increasing in r. Then, any value of n that satisfies f(1)− s(1) > 0
will result in excess adoption for any other value of r. From equation 17, the value of n
that satisfies this condition is given by n ≥ 4a+c−5h2a+2c−4h . For instance, when n = 3, as long as
3 ≥ 4a+c−5h2a+2c−4h , that is 2a ≥ 7h− 5c, only excess adoption is possible. 
At this point, a numerical example may be useful to clarify. Let’s consider a demand
function such that p = 12 − Q in a market with two firms that engage in Cournot
competition. In this market, there is an existing technology (which implies variable costs
h = 3 but no fixed costs), and a second (new) technology becomes available (this “new”
technology has a fixed cost F and no variable costs, c = 0). Let r denote the number of
firms that adopt the new technology. Solving, we get the results provided in Table 4.
r = 0 r = 1 r = 2
p 6 5 4
qold 3 2 −
qnew − 5 4
Πold 9 4 −
Πnew − 25− F 16− F
W 36 53.5− F 64− 2F
Table 4: Cournot oligopoly with demand p = 12−Q, and two cost functions c1(x) = 3x
and c2(x) = F . The parameter r indicates the number of adopters of the new
technology.
From Table 4 we can find the values of F that would cause an additional firm to adopt
the new technology. We represent this situation in Figure 3. This graph consists of three
lines. Along the middle one, we find the threshold values of F that determine the optimal
number of adopters of the new technology from the point of view of society (10.5 and
17.5) and firms themselves (12, 16). As we can see in the upper line, from the point of
view of firms, it would be optimal to have 0 adopters for values of F > 16, 1 adopter for
F ∈ [12, 16] and 2 adopters for F < 12. Society, however, would prefer to have 0 adopters
if F > 17.5; 1 if F ∈ [10.5, 17.5]; and 2 if F < 10.5 (see bottom line). This means there
are two sets of values of F for which the optimal decision for r is different from the point
of view of firms and society.
F10.5 17.5
12 16
s(2) s(1)
f(2) f(1)
Firms
Society
2 firms 1 firm 0 firms
2 firms 1 firm 0 firms
Figure 2: Optimal thresholds for technology adoption.
(i) For values of F ∈ [16, 17.5], society would prefer r = 1, but we will see no firms
adopting the new technology. The reason for this shortage is similar to that of Proposition 2
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in the case we saw before for monopoly. That is, although society benefits (W increases if
r changes from 0 to 1), the increase in revenues for the firm is not enough to compensate
the increase in fixed costs (profits decrease from 9 to 25− F ).
(ii) For values of F ∈ [10.5, 12], society would prefer r = 1, but we will see two firms
adopting the new technology. The reason for this excess is business stealing. That is,
although the new adopter benefits (profits increases from 4 to 16− F if r changes from 1
to 2), that increase in profits is not enough to compensate the increase in fixed costs from
society’s point of view (W decrease from 53.5− F to 64− 2F ). In the end, part of the
additional revenue for the new adopter comes from clients “stolen” from the other firm.
3.3 Taxes
We will see that the ad valorem tax is more prone to excess adoption than the unitary
tax. This may render the unitary tax welfare superior to the ad valorem tax.
As we have seen, one of the problems of technology choice is that it may lead to
excess of adoption of a particular technology. In the monopoly case (see proposition 3),
we concluded that ad valorem taxes give more incentives to adopt a low marginal cost
technology than unitary taxation. Intuitively, this result may be extended to oligopolies,
since any firm in an oligopoly acts as a monopoly for the residual demand. Since ad
valorem taxes favor excess of entry, when we face this problem in the oligopoly, it seems
straightforward that the solution offered by unit taxes (which have the opposite effect)
may bring us closer to the option preferred by the society. In this section, we will study
this possibility in more detail.
In particular, we will be concentrating on cases where the number of adopters is
different depending on the tax regime implemented, because (as Denicolo and Matteuzzi
(2000) and Anderson et al. (2001) showed) if the number of adopters is the same under
both regimes, ad valorem taxes will be superior. Different patterns of technology choice is
a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for unit tax superiority.
Let’s consider a demand function such that P = a−Q in a market with n firms that
engage in Cournot competition. In this market, there is an existing technology (which
implies a variable cost c(x) = K+hx) and a new technology becomes available (this “new”
technology –it may be an improvement in the current technology– has higher fixed costs
but lower variable costs, such that c(x) = F +K + cx, with c < h and K ≥ 0, F > 0)5.
Let r denote the number of firms that adopt the new technology.
After an ad valorem tax, τ , is imposed the demand perceived by the firms becomes
p = (1− τ)(a−Q). Using equations 9, 11, 12, 13 and 14, substituting a for a(1− τ), and
b for 1− τ , we find that equation 13 becomes
f(τ, r) = (h− c) [2n(a(1− τ)− c) + (h− c)n(n− 2r)](1− τ)(n+ 1)2 . (18)
Doing the same with a unitary tax, t, the perceived demand is p = a − t − Q, and
substituting now a for a− t and b for 1 we obtain:
f(t, r) = (h− c) [2n(a− t− c) + (h− c)n(n− 2r)](n+ 1)2 . (19)
5The parameter K allows us to set the number of firms in the long run equilibrium, by adjusting the
profits very near to zero.
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Now, to be able to compare, we will find the level of unit taxes that yields the same
government revenue with r adopters (G(t, r)) as the ad valorem tax would with r + 1
adopters (G(τ, r + 1)). That is, we find t such that G(t, r) = G(τ, r + 1) for a given τ .
Let’s first calculate G(τ, r+ 1) = τP (τ, r+ 1)Q(τ, r+ 1), where P (τ, r+ 1) = p(τ, r+1)1−τ .
From equation 9 we obtain
p(τ, r + 1) = a(1− τ) + (r + 1)c+ (n− r − 1)h1 + n .
We turn now to calculating G(t, r) = t(a− t− p(t, r)), and from equation 9 we obtain
p(t, r) = a− t+ rc+ (n− r)h1 + n .
To find the value of t such that G(t, r) = G(τ, r + 1), we solve for t to get:
t(τ, r) =
D −
√
D2 − 4n(n+ 1)G(τ, r + 1)
2n , (20)
where D = n(a− h) + r(h− c). Note that t(τ, r) is continuous where it exists.
We can enunciate the following
Proposition 6. Suppose a Cournot oligopoly, with demand P = a−Q, and n firms that
choose freely between technologies with cost functions C(x) = K+hx and C(x) = F+K+cx
(with 0 ≤ c < h and K, F > 0). If n > 4a+c−5h2a+2c−4h , then for a small enough ad valorem tax,
τ , and for each r ≤ n/2− c/(h− c), there is a unitary tax, t(τ, r), revenue equivalent to
τ , such that t(τ, r) is welfare superior to τ for some intervals of F .
Proof. Using equation 13 for τ and t we can represent graphically adoption of the new
technology under both tax schemes.
F
f(τ, r + 1) f(τ, r)
f(t, r + 1) f(t, r) unit tax
ad valorem
r + 1 firms r firms r − 1 firms
r + 1 firms r firms r − 1 firms
Figure 3: Thresholds for technology adoption under unit and ad valorem tax regimes.
As we can see in the graph, r + 1 firms will adopt the new technology under ad
valorem taxes if f(τ, r + 2) < F < f(τ, r + 1). On the other hand, r firms will adopt
the new technology under unit taxes when f(t, r + 1) < F < f(t, r). Hence, whenever
F ∈ [f(t, r + 1), f(τ, r + 1)] there will be r + 1 adopters with the ad valorem tax and r
adopters with the unit tax.
We will see next that as τ increases, so does the interval. When τ = t = 0, it is
clear that f(t, r + 1) = f(τ, r + 1). On the other hand, as τ grows the lower bound
(f(t, r + 1)) of the interval decreases while its upper bound (f(τ, r + 1)) increases. To
see that, note that ∂f(t, r)
∂τ
< 0 because ∂f(t, r)
∂t
< 0 ∀r and ∂t
∂τ
> 0.6 On the other hand,
∂f(τ, r)
∂τ
= n(h−c)(n+1)2(1−τ)2 ((h− c)(n− 2r)− 2c) > 0 if r ≤ n/2− c/(h− c).
6If ad valorem taxes increase, unit taxes must increase as well to keep government revenue constant;
that is, ∂t(τ, r)∂τ > 0, because
∂G(τ, r+1)
∂τ > 0.
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We must now prove that there is some τ ∗ > 0 such that welfare is higher with r
adopters and unit tax than with r + 1 adopters and an ad valorem tax for any τ < τ ∗.
For that, we consider W (t, r) −W (τ, r + 1) as a function of τ . We know, on the one
hand, that for τ = t = 0, W (τ, r + 1) = W (t, r + 1). We also know (from equation 17)
that W (0, r + 1) will be lower than W (0, r) for n > 4a+c−5h2a+2c−4h , because there is excess
adoption of the lower marginal cost technology for any r ≥ 1. We can then deduce that
since W (t, r)−W (τ, r + 1) is a continuous function and takes positive values for τ = 0,
it is positive for some interval [0, τ ∗], with τ ∗ > 0. This completes the proof. 
Proposition 6 states the possibility of finding welfare superiority of unit taxes over
ad valorem taxes in a Cournot asymmetric oligopoly, without considering its likelihood.
We turn now to the study of this question. As we can see from equation 20, t(τ, r) is a
function of all the parameters of the model; i.e., a, h, c, n and r. The resulting expression
of f(t(τ, r), r) (even in simplified form) is unmanageably long, making its analytical study
difficult and notationally cumbersome. To circumvent this problem, we will use graphical
analysis to determine the intervals for which unit taxes are superior to ad valorem taxes
in the space τ - F . In B, we present figures 4, 5, 6 and 7. Each graph corresponds to a
demand p = 100−Q, and several values of the number of firms n, and the marginal costs,
c and h. In each graph the shaded area for any value of τ represents the intervals of F
where unit taxes are welfare superior to ad valorem taxes.
Let’s describe the axis and different functions of the graphs. Along the horizontal axis
we represent the ad valorem tax (τ) and along the vertical axis we have the fixed cost (F ).
In each graph there will be three functions, for any value of r:
(i) The upper line in every area is f(τ, r), which represents the value of F that changes
the equilibrium number of adopters from r − 1 to r under ad valorem taxes.
(ii) The lower line in every area is f(t, r), which represents the value of F that changes
the equilibrium number of adopters from r − 1 to r under under unit taxes.
(iii) The right-most line in every area is a curve that represents the value of F
for which society is indifferent between r adopters with ad valorem taxes and r − 1
adopters with revenue equivalent unitary taxes. The equation of this curve is given by:
W (t, r)−W (τ, r + 1) = 0. Calling Q(τ, r + 1) = Qτ and q(τ, r + 1) = qτ , we get
W (τ, r + 1) = aQτ − Q
2
τ
2 − (r + 1)cq
c
τ − (n− (r + 1))hqhτ − nK − (r + 1)F. (21)
And, with Q(t, r) = Qt, q(t, r) = qt and W (t, r) = W (t(τ, r), r), we get
W (t, r) = aQt − Q
2
t
2 − rcq
c
t − (n− r)hqht − nK − rF. (22)
In the graphs, the shaded areas represent values of τ and F such that unitary taxes
are superior to ad valorem taxes for a given set of parameters, linear demand and constant
marginal costs. These areas share a common feature: in them, there would be one more
adopter of the new technology if taxes are ad valorem (as opposed to unitary).
As we can see in the graphs, for a given set of parameter values, areas where ad valorem
taxes would be preferable co-exist with areas where unit taxes are the better alternative,
so it is difficult to establish a general rule of superiority. The areas seem to grow narrower
as F (the fixed cost associated with adopting the new technology) decreases, probably
because as (Anderson et al., 2001, p. 238) argued, ad valorem taxation “leads to relatively
less production from high-cost firms.” The number of areas and the distance between
them largely depends on the assumptions of the particular model.
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4 Final remarks
This paper has presented non trivial examples of cases where the social optimality of ad
valorem taxes is reversed, with unitary taxes being a better alternative. All the models
rely on technology choice. By this, we understand any change in technology, either small
or large. For example, small technology changes could include a case where all firms share
the same technology, but small differences exist in marginal and fixed cost due to previous
choices.
In general, our findings suggest that, in monopolies where technological change causes
a decrease in marginal costs, ad valorem taxes remain superior. However, equivalent unit
taxes could be more beneficial in monopolies where technological change results in a price
increase. We see this as unlikely, but for example mini-mills in the steel market have
higher marginal costs and lower fixed costs than blast furnaces.
Stronger results are given for oligopolies where firms face a technology choice. We
find situations where ad valorem taxes (but not unit taxes) lead to excessive technology
adoption, resulting in the superiority of unit taxes.
This paper does not pretend to establish the likelihood of the unit tax superiority in
the presence of technology choice. Instead, we illustrate that this superiority is possible.
We think that this is important because it contradicts the established wisdom of the
superiority of ad valorem taxes in asymmetric Cournot oligopolies.
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Appendix A Code
This code, written in maxima, generates the graphs in B. The code is written for a case
with eight firms. The number of lines should be modified if using a different number of
firms (lines should be deleted to use less firms or added to incorporate a greater number of
firms). In the code, the second line sets the values for the basic parameters of the models.
Lines 3 to 20 come from equations 9 to 22. Two notes are in order. First, X in the first
line is used to find the intersection, in lines 21 and 22, between W (t, r) −W (τ, r + 1)
and f(t, r), or f(τ, r). If for some value of X no intersection point is found, then other
values should be provided. Second, when f(τ, r) < f(t, r), the area does not exists and
the graph is not generated. In this case, the last lines should be deleted until the graph is
generated.
1 kill(all)$load(draw)$ X:0.4;
2 [a, h, c, n]:[100, 2, 0, 8]$
3 pz(z,r):=(a*(1-z)+r*c+(n-r)*h)/(1+n)$
4 Pz(z,r):=pz(z,r)/(1-z)$
5 Qz(z,r):=a-Pz(z,r)$
6 qzc(z,r):=(pz(z,r)-c)/(1-z)$
7 qzh(z,r):=(pz(z,r)-h)/(1-z)$
8 Gz(z,r):=z*Pz(z,r)*Qz(z,r)$
9 D(r):=n*(a-h)+r*(h-c)$
10 t(z,r):=(D(r)-sqrt(D(r)^2-4*n*(n+1)*Gz(z,r+1)))/(2*n)$
11 pt(z,r):=(a-t(z,r)+r*c+(n-r)*h)/(1+n)$
12 Pt(z,r):=pt(z,r)+t(z,r)$
13 Qt(z,r):=a-Pt(z,r)$
14 qtc(z,r):=pt(z,r)-c$
15 qth(z,r):=pt(z,r)-h$
16 ft(z,r):=(h-c)*n*(2*(a-t(z,r)-c)+(h-c)*(n-2*r))/(n+1)^2$
17 fz(z,r):=(h-c)*n*(2*(a*(1-z)-c)+(h-c)*(n-2*r))/((1-z)*(n+1)^2)$
18 Wt(z,r):=a*Qt(z,r)-Qt(z,r)^2/2-r*c*qtc(z,r)-(n-r)*h*qth(z,r)$
19 Wz(z,r):=a*Qz(z,r)-Qz(z,r)^2/2-r*c*qzc(z,r)-(n-r)*h*qzh(z,r)$
20 W(z,r):=Wz(z,r+1)-Wt(z,r)$
21 for r:0 step 1 thru n-1 do a[r+1]:find_root(ft(z,r+1)-W(z,r),z,0,X);
22 for r:0 step 1 thru n-1 do b[r+1]:find_root(fz(z,r+1)-W(z,r),z,0,X);
23 draw2d(grid=true,terminal=’eps,
24 filled_func=ft(z,1),fill_color=gray, explicit(fz(z,1),z,0,a[1]),
25 filled_func=fz(z,1),fill_color=gray, explicit(W(z,0),z,a[1],b[1]),
26 filled_func=ft(z,2),fill_color=gray, explicit(fz(z,2),z,0,a[2]),
27 filled_func=fz(z,2),fill_color=gray, explicit(W(z,1),z,a[2],b[2]),
28 filled_func=ft(z,3),fill_color=gray, explicit(fz(z,3),z,0,a[3]),
29 filled_func=fz(z,3),fill_color=gray, explicit(W(z,2),z,a[3],b[3]),
30 filled_func=ft(z,4),fill_color=gray, explicit(fz(z,4),z,0,a[4]),
31 filled_func=fz(z,4),fill_color=gray, explicit(W(z,3),z,a[4],b[4]),
32 filled_func=ft(z,5),fill_color=gray, explicit(fz(z,5),z,0,a[5]),
33 filled_func=fz(z,5),fill_color=gray, explicit(W(z,4),z,a[5],b[5]),
34 filled_func=ft(z,6),fill_color=gray, explicit(fz(z,6),z,0,a[6]),
35 filled_func=fz(z,6),fill_color=gray, explicit(W(z,5),z,a[6],b[6]),
36 filled_func=ft(z,7),fill_color=gray, explicit(fz(z,7),z,0,a[7]),
37 filled_func=fz(z,7),fill_color=gray, explicit(W(z,6),z,a[7],b[7]),
38 filled_func=ft(z,8),fill_color=gray, explicit(fz(z,8),z,0,a[8]),
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39 filled_func=fz(z,8),fill_color=gray, explicit(W(z,7),z,a[8],b[8]))$
Appendix B Graphs
Figures 4, 5 and 6 represent a Cournot oligopoly with 3, 6, and 8 firms respectively. In all
cases, the demand is given by p = 100 − Q, and there are two cost functions available:
c1(x) = K + hx and c2(x) = F + K + cx. The figures have four panels, representing
different sets of parameter values. The panel in the NW corner corresponds to parameter
values c = 0 and h = 2; c = 0 and h = 12 in the NE; c = 10 and h = 12 in the SW; and
c = 50 and h = 52 in the SE. The value of K is arbitrary and does not play any role in
the graphs, but it may be used to guarantee that n is the number of firms in the long run.
In every graph, the ad valorem tax (τ) is represented along the horizontal axis, and
the fixed cost F is represented along the vertical axis. At any τ = τ0, the shaded areas
indicate the values of F such that welfare will be greater with the unit tax than with
the ad valorem tax. The reason is that in those areas r firms enter with ad valorem tax,
and r − 1 firms with unit tax. For instance, the first shadowed area (starting from high
values of F ) corresponds to the case where only one firm adopts with ad valorem tax,
but no firm adopts the new technology with unit tax (r = 1). As F decreases for τ = τ0
(that is, as we move downwards along the line given by τ = τ0), the second shadowed area
corresponds to the case r = 2, etc.
As we can see comparing figures 4, 5 and 6, the graphs seem to indicate that as the
number of firms in the market increases, so does the likelihood of finding a reversal of
the superiority of the ad valorem tax. The other parameters, h and c, also influence the
shape of the areas.
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Figure 4: Cournot oligopoly with three firms. The ad valorem tax (τ) is represented
along the horizontal axis, and the fixed cost F is represented along the
vertical axis. For every value of τ , the shaded area represents the values
of F with unit tax superiority. In the graph each of the three functions is
represented by a contour of the shaded area. The top outline of the shaded
area represents f(τ, r). The bottom outline represents f(t, r), and the one
on the right is W (t, r)−W (τ, r + 1) = 0.
 46
 47
 48
 49
 50
 51
 0  0.01  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.07  0.08
 260
 280
 300
 320
 340
 360
 380
 0  0.05  0.1  0.15  0.2  0.25
 41
 42
 43
 44
 45
 46
 0  0.01  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.07  0.08  0.09
 20
 21
 22
 23
 24
 25
 26
 0  0.01  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.07  0.08
Figure 5: Cournot oligopoly with six firms. Observe that in the NE panel there are
only four shaded areas; the reason is that when r = 5, 6, f(τ, r) < f(t, r)
for any τ > 0.
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Figure 6: Cournot oligopoly with eight firms. Observe that in the NE panel there are
only five shaded areas, and in the SE panel there are only six areas. The
reason again is that f(τ, r) < f(t, r).
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Figure 7 represents an oligopoly with a structure very similar to that of the NW
panel in the previous figures (demand p = 100−Q, c = 0 and h = 2), but with a larger
number of firms. This figure is made with the code in A, but completing the last lines
appropriately. In the graph, the panel on the left represents an oligopoly with 16 firms,
and the panel on the right an oligopoly with 24 firms. The numbers in the shaded areas
indicate the number of firms that adopt the low cost technology under ad valorem taxes.
The overlapping of shaded areas means that if r firms enter in the presence of unit taxes,
r + n firms (with n > 1) enter with ad valorem taxes. Note that in these overlapping
areas the function in equation 20 does not hold, since the function is valid only if when r
firms adopt the new technology with unitary taxes, r + 1 firms do so with ad valorem
taxes. However, from a welfare point of view, this situation seems to favor unit taxes even
more than the case we consider in our model.
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Figure 7: Cournot oligopoly with 16 firms (left panel), and 24 firm (right panel). As
before, with n = 16 firms, if r > 10, then f(τ, r) < f(t, r). The same
happens with n = 24 firms when r > 14.
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